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Institutions change—in Iraq, the formerly Communist countries and many private and public 
organizations. But do people adapt to the new institutional environment, and if so, how quickly? 
This paper examines institutional change—how long it takes people to transition from one 
institutional environment to another or, put differently, whether old institutional regimes have an 
afterglow.  More specifically, we study whether trust and trustworthiness can be fostered by first 
exposing people to an environment conducive to trust. We are interested in whether (intrinsic) 
trust and trustworthiness can be induced in the long run by providing extrinsic incentives for 
trust and trustworthiness in the short run. 
Reputation systems may provide incentives for trustworthiness and trust. Direct 
reputation building may occur in repeated games where pairs of subjects play the same stage 
game repeatedly, but repeat transactions are not necessarily the rule in today’s global economy. 
In population games where agents are randomly re-matched in every period indirect reputation 
systems are a potential substitute for personal interactions—provided information about others’ 
past behavior is available. On eBay, for example, buyers are willing to pay a premium of 8.1% of 
the selling price to a seller with an established good reputation (Paul Resnick, Richard 
Zeckhauser, John Swanson and Kate Lockwood 2003).  
This paper examines experimentally to what degree indirect reputation building 
substitutes for direct reputation building in repeat interactions in the short run and analyzes the 
effects these environments have on behavior in the long run.  In contrast, most earlier 
experimental studies focus on one-shot and repeat interactions in the short run.
1    2 
We compare the effects of direct and indirect reputation building in a binary-choice trust 
game where a buyer, the trustor, can either interact with the seller, the trustee, or exit. The trustee 
can either honor or exploit trust. The payoffs are such that a money-maximizing trustee prefers 
exploiting to honoring trust in a one-shot game—while a money-maximizing trustor prefers not 
offering trust to being exploited. The unique Nash equilibrium of the single-shot game predicts 
no trade. Figure 1 presents the game we implemented with the actual payoffs in cents used.  
Figure 1 about here 
In our experiment, subjects participate in the trust game in two blocks of 10 rounds each, 
which is common knowledge.
2 In phase 1, the first 10 rounds, they are confronted either with a 
standard, “one-shot” random matching treatment (“stranger” or “S”); a fixed-pairs, finitely 
repeated game treatment (“partner” or “P”); or a random-matching treatment (“reputation-
stranger” or “RS”). In the latter, trustors are informed about their trustees’ past behavior in each 
round. In phase 2, rounds 11-20, all subjects interact in the stranger environment (without 
information about the past). 312 subjects participated in our experiment; 96 in the S-treatment (4 
sessions), 102 in the P-treatment (5 sessions) and 114 in the RS-treatment (4 sessions). Roles 
were randomly assigned and kept fix during the experiment.
  
For the short run (phase 1), models incorporating incomplete information about agents’ 
preferences and/or rationality allow for reputation building, directly and indirectly, in finitely 
repeated games (David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson 1982). If there are 
such reputation effects, there should be more trust and trustworthiness in P and RS than in S in 
the short run and a decrease of trust and trustworthiness towards the end of the first 10 rounds. 
Our results for the first phase are in line with this prediction.   3 
For the long run (phase 2), all orthodox models predict the same behavior. We should see 
low (or zero) levels of trust and trustworthiness in all three treatments since incentives for 
building a reputation have been removed. In that sense, orthodox models predict that history does 
not matter. If, on the other hand, reputation-based interactions “crowd in” trust and 
trustworthiness or evoke specific norms of behavior, differences between the treatments might be 
observed. Theoretically, such long-term effects require either changes in preferences (Bohnet, 
Frey and Huck 2001) or some inertia in adjustment and learning (Ido Erev and Alvin Roth 1998).  
In this paper, we take an empirical approach and examine whether there are any history 
effects and, if so, whether they are systematic. In particular, we estimate subjects’ propensity to 
trust (or to be trustworthy) in the second phase of the experiment as a function of the institution 
they were exposed to in the first phase; their experiences in the first and second phase; their type 
(as measured by their initial propensity to trust and be trustworthy); and time. In our data, we 
find that subjects do understand changes in the incentive structure and fully discount previous 
experiences if they were not gained in the same environment. While this is in line with orthodox 
theory, our second main finding challenges it. We find that exposure to a partner treatment 
makes trustees more trustworthy in the long run. Partner and reputation-stranger treatments 
produce similar results in the short but not in the long run. 
I. Experimental results 
Table 1 presents average trust and trustworthiness rates for each treatment and the two phases of 
the experiment (Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix present the data by round). Trust rates indicate 
the fraction of trustors offering trust in a given round; trustworthiness rates indicate the fraction 
of trustees honoring trust in a given round, conditional on having been offered trust.  
Table 1 about here   4 
In phase 1, trustors are significantly more likely to trust in P than in S, and somewhat 
more likely to trust in RS than in S. Trustees are equally likely to honor trust in P and RS and 
significantly less likely to do so in S.
3  Our results show the existence of rather strong reputation 
effects, especially for trustees.  
In phase 2, trust and trustworthiness rates in P are slightly higher than in the two stranger 
treatments, suggesting history effects. The differences between P and RS are significant.
4 To get 
a clearer picture of subjects’ behavior in the second phase we estimate linear probability models 
for trustors’ propensity to trust and trustees’ propensity to be trustworthy.
5 We run two random-
effects panel regressions:  
RATEi,t = dC + ßRSi + ?Pi + dEFPi + eEFPi*RS + ?EFPi*P + ?ESPi,t + ?ESPi,t*RS + ?ESPi,t*P 
  + ?TYPEi + ?TYPEi*RS + µTYPEi*P + ?RDt + ?RDt*SR + ?RDt*P + vi + ei,t  
where RATEi,t is subject i’s probability to trust (in the first regression) or be trustworthy (in the 
second regression). C is the constant; RSi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if subject i is in the 
reputation-stranger treatment and zero otherwise; Pi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if subject i is 
in the partner treatment and zero otherwise; EFPi is subject i’s experience during the first 
phase—rounds 1-10 (i.e. a trustor’s experienced trustworthiness rate or a trustee’s experienced 
trust rate); ESPi,t is subject i’s experience up to period t-1 in the second phase—rounds 11-20 
(experienced trustworthiness rate for the trustor and experienced trust rate for the trustee up to t-
1); TYPEi captures subject i’s initial propensity to trust or be trustworthy (a dummy variable for 
the trustor equal to 1 if the subject trusted in round 1 and 0 otherwise; and the average 
trustworthiness rate of subject i in the first 10 rounds for the trustee)
 6; RDt is the round; vi the 
idiosyncratic random-effect of subject i, and ei,t the error term. Table 2 shows the results.  
Table 2 about here   5 
For trustors we find: There are no main treatment effects. The experience of 
trustworthiness in the first phase (EFP) and a subject’s initial propensity to trust (TYPE) only 
matter in S (without institutional change).  In the other treatments where trustworthiness can be 
strategic in the first phase, neither others’ nor own actions in the first phase affect trust in the 
non-strategic second phase. In contrast, recent experiences in the previous rounds of phase 2 
(ESP) are important in all treatments. The more trustworthiness subjects have recently 
experienced, the more willing they are to trust.
7 There is a significant time trend in all treatments: 
Subjects become less trusting as the end nears.  
For trustees we find: Subjects in P are substantially more trustworthy than subjects RS 
and a little more trustworthy than those in S. The experience of trust does not matter for 
trustworthiness, independent of whether the experience was gained in the first or the second 
phase (EFP or ESP). Trust does not breed trustworthiness. A subject’s propensity to be 
trustworthy in the first phase (TYPE) is only relevant when it was non-strategic and, thus, a true 
matter of type. While Figure 2 suggests that trustworthiness decreases over time, the regressions 
show that this is an artifact of the matching—contrary to what trustors seem to expect.  
II. Discussion and Conclusions 
Direct and indirect reputation systems increase trust and trustworthiness in the short run. 
Subjects strongly respond to the direct reputation building opportunities in a repeated game. 
With indirect reputation building, trustees appear to respond more strongly to the institutional 
environment than trustors. The benefits of this more complex and less familiar environment may 
not be as obvious as the advantages of repeat interactions, which may help explain why many 
consumers do not trust internet-based transactions using indirect reputation systems such as on 
eBay (Peter Kollock 1999). Our results suggest that they may be too pessimistic.    6 
We also find that past experience is more relevant for trustors than for trustees. 
Experiences of trustworthiness increase the likelihood of trust in the same treatment; experiences 
of trust have no effect on the likelihood of trustworthiness, i.e. trust is not self-fulfilling as 
suggested, e.g., by Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta (2001). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we find that there are significant history effects. In 
particular, we find that trustees are more trustworthy after having been exposed to a partner 
treatment. The partner treatment is the most effective institutional arrangement to foster trust and 
trustworthiness in the short and in the long run. Indeed, it appears as if experiencing the intimate 
partner relationship breeds genuine trustworthiness. This might have important implications for 
issues in institutional design and education. Interactions in small closely-knit groups may have 
long-lasting beneficial consequences.   7 
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Table 1: Trust and trustworthiness rates in phase 1 (r. 1-10) and phase 2 (r. 11-20) 
Trust rate  Trustworthiness rate  Treatment 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 1  Phase 2 
S: Stranger (N=48)  0.32  0.23  0.30  0.18 
R: Reputation-stranger (N=57)  0.43  0.19  0.55  0.18 
P: Partner (N=51)  0.59  0.32  0.61  0.28 
 
 
  Trustor (A) 
Trustee (B) 
 Exit  Enter 
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Table 2: Estimated trust and trustworthiness rates in phase 2—rounds 11-20 
 
 
Linear probability regressions, standard errors in parentheses.  
^ for p<0.1, * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01.  
 













EFP (Experience in 
first phase) 
0.309 ^    
(0.172) 
-0.355    
(0.317) 




0.019    
(0.419) 






ESP (Experience in 
second phase up to t-1) 
0.444 **      
(0.109)  
-0.483   
(0.682) 




0.418    
(0.935) 
ESP * Partner  -0.208       
(0.130) 
0.984     
(0.801) 
Type  0.153 *      
(0.076) 
0.492 **    
(0.144) 
Type *  
Reputation-Stranger 
-0.142    
(0.101) 
-0.485 *    
(0.217) 
Type * Partner  0.101       
(0.103) 
-0.522 *  
(0.230) 
Round  -0.031 **      
(0.006) 
-0.007     
(0.018) 
Round *  
Reputation-Stranger 
-0.008      
(0.008) 
-0.009    
(0.025) 
Round * Partner  -0.005     
(0.008) 
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1 For a recent survey, see James Andreoni and Rachel Croson (2002). Studies examining the 
effects of different institutional environments over time include Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey and 
Steffen Huck (2001) and Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2003).  
2 The experiments were computerized using Urs Fischbacher’s (1999) z-tree software.  The 
instructions are available upon request.  
3 Mann-Whitney U-tests using session averages aggregated over the first 10 rounds as 
independent observations reveal the following p-values (two-tailed) for trust: P-S: p=0.01; RS-S: 
p=0.08; P-RS: p=0.14, and for trustworthiness: P-S: p=0.01; RS-S: p=0.02; P-RS: p=0.33. 
4 Mann-Whitney U-tests using session averages aggregated over the second 10 rounds as 
independent observations reveal the following p-values (two-tailed) for trust: P-S: p=0.22; RS-S: 
p=0.56; P-RS: p=0.03, and for trustworthiness: P-S: p=0.12; RS-S: p=0.56; P-RS: p=0.09. 
5 For samples of this size linear probability models are more robust than logit or probit models. 
6 Taking a similar average for trustors does not make sense since trust in later rounds may be 
driven by experience.   12 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Since one can only experience trustworthiness by trusting (which might cause ESP and trust 
rates to be correlated) we ran two control regressions, one for the initially trusting type 
(TYPE=1) and one for the skeptical type (TYPE=0). As in the overall regression (Table 2), the 
coefficients for ESP are around 0.4 and highly significant. 